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NEUTRALIZING COGNITIVE BIAS:
AN INVITATION TO PROSECUTORS
Alafair Burke1
With the number of criminal defendants exonerated by
DNA evidence nearing the two hundred mark,2 and with multiple
states flirting with death penalty moratoriums in part to avoid killing the innocent,3 we appear to stand at a milestone in our treatment of claims by criminal defendants that they have been wrongly
convicted. Some commentators have declared the dawn of a new
“movement” to support claims of innocence.4 Others have gone so

Associate Professor, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A., Reed College; J.D,
Stanford Law School. I am grateful to the editors of the NYU Journal of Law and
Liberty for inviting me to participate in this timely symposium by elaborating on
prosecutorial debiasing strategies that I discussed in a previous paper published in
the William & Mary Law Review. My gratitude also extends to Cynthia Leigh, former reference librarian at Hofstra Law School, and to Matthew Connolly for valuable
research assistance.
2
Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/Browse-Profiles.php (last visited February
21, 2007) (listing 198 exonerations since 1989).
3 Executions have been suspended in Illinois and New Jersey, and in California on a
de facto basis despite a failed legislative attempt to impose a formal moratorium.
Carolyn Marshall, California Assembly Sidelines a Moratorium on Executions, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at A12. In addition, the prior governor of Maryland issued a
moratorium in that state, but it was rescinded by the current governor. Jennifer
McMenamin, Glendening says state still needs moratorium, BALT. SUN, Jan. 12, 2006 at
1B. Moratorium legislation has been introduced in several other states.
4 As one commentator claimed, “An entire innocence movement is afoot.” David
Feige, The Dark Side of Innocence, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 15, 2003, at 15. The Innocence
Project, whose work lies behind so many DNA exonerations, has declared a “new
civil rights movement.” The Innocence Project, As 100th Innocent Prisoner Is Freed by
1
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far as to call the movement a “revolution.”5 Regardless of what we
call this moment, Richard Rosen is undoubtedly correct when he
observes that we potentially “are at the beginning of an exciting
new period of American criminal justice, one directly related to the
acknowledgment that we convict innocent people.”6
One notable aspect of this burgeoning movement is its attempt to bring into the fold the prosecutors who are frequently depicted as part of the wrongful conviction problem, rather than its
solution. Traditionally, prosecutorial decision making has been
studied through a lens of fault, blame, and intentional wrongdoing.7
Consistent with this lens, those who have studied the downsides of
broad prosecutorial discretion have blamed bad prosecutorial decisions on overzealousness,8 flawed cultural and individual values,

DNA Tests, Innocence Network Convenes to Map the Future of "New Civil Rights Movement"
in
Criminal
Justice,
Jan.
17,
2002,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=280&scid=1. See also Daniel S.
Medwed, Anatomy of a Wrongful Conviction: Theoretical Implications and Practical Solutions, 51 VILL. L. REV. 337, 376 (2006) (arguing that the narratives of wrongfully convicted defendants are essential “if the lessons from recent exonerations are to instigate a "New Civil Rights Movement" for the twenty-first century).
5 See Mark A. Godsey & Thomas Pulley, The Innocence Revolution and Our "Evolving
Standards of Decency" in Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 265, 267
(2004); Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 573, 573 (2004).
6 Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 237 (calling this an
“Age of Innocence”).
7 See, e.g., Kenneth Bresler, “I Never Lost a Trial”: When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 541 (1996) (criticizing prosecutors who
“keep personal tallies …for self-promotion”); James Liebman, The Overproduction of
Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2072-97 (2000) (discussing the potential for prosecutorial misconduct throughout the evolution of a death penalty case); Tracey L.
Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with
Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 890 (1995) (“Prosecutorial misconduct is
readily apparent to any lawyer who keeps abreast of appellate review of criminal
convictions.”).
8 E.g, Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15
AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 204-15 (1988) (describing factors that cause prosecutors to pursue
cases “overzealously”); Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV.
393, 458 (1992) (arguing that “the present ethos of overzealous prosecutorial advocacy” is “ingrained”); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to
Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 134 (2004) (attributing the lack
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and a lack of moral courage.9 The collective impact of this faultbased narrative is the depiction of prosecutors as dogmatic adversaries of innocence, wholly abandoning their ethical obligations as
neutral advocates of justice.10 In contrast, much of the narrative recently emerging from the growing innocence movement appears
focused on persuading prosecutors of their importance in this new
movement, not as adversaries, but as equal partners in the prevention of wrongful convictions.
Professor Rosen reminds prosecutors of what should be obvious when he observes, “[i]n the criminal justice system, neither
side wins when an innocent person is convicted.”11 Accordingly, “It
is important for prosecutors and police officers to be willing to acknowledge the possibility that mistakes are made in individual
cases. There are even more compelling reasons for prosecutors and
police officers to join others . . . in a cooperative effort to find remedies for the causes of wrongful convictions.”12
Striking a similar chord in his important article on prosecutorial resistance toward post-conviction claims of innocence, Professor Daniel Medwed encourages cooperation between prosecutors
and defense counsel, noting:
A dialogue between these traditional adversaries may help
to show that, despite any differences between the two

of prosecutorial support for post-conviction claims of innocence in part to “the emphasis district attorneys’ offices place on conviction rates”).
9 E.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
309, 350 (2001) (noting that prosecutors who lack “moral courage” pose a danger to
innocent defendants); see also Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 57-60 (1997) (advocating ad hoc
invocation of moral judgment).
10 Prosecutors are not only obligated to act as advocates to enforce the law, but are
also entrusted to ensure that justice is met. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.8 cmt. 1 (2001) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate."). Cf. Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values:
Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789,
792-94 (2000) (discussing the public interests served by prosecutors).
11 Rosen, supra note 6, at 287.
12 Id. at 288.
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camps generally, they stand on common ground when it
comes to post-conviction innocence claims: no one wins
when an innocent person remains in prison. Instead of the
“zeal deal,” the real deal for prosecutors and defense attorneys operating in the domain of post-conviction innocence
claims should be a willingness to work together, on occasion, and a mutual recognition that actually innocent people are languishing in our prison system.13
In addition to these calls for prosecutorial cooperation, there has
been increased attention to the possibility that unintentional cognitive biases can play at least as large a role in wrongful convictions
as intentional prosecutorial misconduct. A growing literature seeks
to attribute poor prosecutorial decision making to a set of information-processing biases that we all share, rather than exclusively to
ethical or moral lapses. From this perspective, prosecutorial resistance to defense claims of innocence can be viewed as deep (and
inherently human) adherences to the “sticky” 14 presumptions of
guilt that result from various forms of cognitive bias that can impede the neutrality of prosecutors throughout their handling of a
case.15
My goal in this Essay is to suggest that reforms framed
around a cognitive understanding of prosecutorial decision making
present an opportunity for prosecutors themselves to counter the
traditional fault-based narrative and to become partners in the

Medwed, supra note 8, at 183.
Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive
Science, 47 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 1587, 1607 (2006) (explaining that prosecutor’s
beliefs about guilt might be “sticky” in that they persevere even when the underlying evidence is undermined).
15 See generally Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel
Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475, 479 (2006); Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Counsel and the
Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1600 (2005); Burke,
supra note 14; Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 316; Medwed, supra note 8, 140-41;
Myrna Raeder, What Does Innocence Have to Do with It?: A Commentary on Wrongful
Convictions and Rationality, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1315, 1327.
13
14
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emerging movement to prevent wrongful convictions. That goal
turns out to be both modest and audacious. While some reform
proposals are sweeping, controversial, and either impractical or
cumbersome to initiate, the focus of this Essay will be on more
modest proposals that should be relatively uncontroversial and
whose implementation rests entirely within the province of prosecutors, either as individual practices or as institutional policies.
However, by focusing on modest, prosecutor-initiated reforms, the
Essay flirts with the bold by throwing down a challenge to prosecutors actually to pursue these strategies. If prosecutors hold the key
to moderate but meaningful reform and yet do nothing, the innocence movement will inevitably – and justifiably – retreat from a
model of cooperation and return entirely to fault-based explanations for wrongful convictions and their accompanying reforms.
I. Prosecutors and Cognitive Bias
Before turning to strategies for improving prosecutorial decision making, let us briefly consider some of the ways that cognitive bias might impede a prosecutor’s neutrality throughout her
handling of a case.16 Consider, for example, the ways in which the
phenomenon known as confirmation bias could affect a prosecutor’s initial charging decision.17 Because confirmation bias leads in-

A number of recent articles provide a more comprehensive treatment of the ways
in which cognitive bias can shape prosecutorial decisions. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note
15 (discussing prosecutorial tunnel vision); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside
the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2496-2519 (2004) (exploring the ways
bounded rationality can affect both prosecutors and defendants in plea bargaining);
Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 316 (examining the effects of tunnel vision on
prosecutors). I previously set forth several of the points raised here in Burke, supra
note 14.
17 Confirmation bias is the tendency of people, when they are testing the validity of a
theory, to favor information that confirms the theory over disconfirming information. See generally PETER C. WASON & PHILIP N. JOHNSON-LAIRD, PSYCHOLOGY OF
REASONING: STRUCTURE & CONTENT (1972); ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION:
MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 112-18 (1999); Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211
(1987); Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Behavioral Confirmation in Social Interac16
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dividuals to seek out and prefer information that tends to confirm
whatever hypothesis they are testing, a prosecutor reviewing a file
to determine a suspect’s guilt would be inclined to look only for
evidence that supports a theory of guilt.18 For instance, the prosecutor might emphasize that a defendant confessed to the crime yet
ignore evidence that might undermine the reliability of that confession.19
Those who have studied wrongful convictions note that a
leading cause of error is “tunnel vision,” in which investigators and
prosecutors hone their sights on one suspect, and then search for
evidence inculpating him, to the neglect of exculpatory evidence or
the consideration of alternative suspects.20 Prosecutorial tunnel vision can be viewed as the culmination of confirmation bias and selective information processing, the inclination to search out and recall information that tends to confirm one’s existing beliefs, and to
devalue disconfirming evidence.21 As a result of confirmation bias,

tion: From Social Perception to Social Reality, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 148
(1978); Mark Snyder & Nancy Cantor, Testing Hypotheses About Other People: The Use
of Historical Knowledge, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 330 (1979); Peter C. Wason,
Reasoning About a Rule, 20 Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 273 (1968).
18 Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 316 (summarizing cases in which law enforcement “sought evidence that would confirm guilt, not disconfirm it”); Brown, supra
note 15, at 1600 (noting the effect that confirmation bias can have on both police and
prosecutorial “fact-development decisions”).
19 Burke, supra note 14, at 1603-04.
20 Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 292; Raeder, supra note 15, at 1327 (“[T]he tunnel
vision problem has been widely noted in wrongful conviction cases. Officers and
prosecutors either don’t realize the significance or accuracy of exculpatory evidence
or on occasion affirmatively conceal it because they are convinced of the suspect’s
guilt.”); STATE OF ILL., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
20,
Commission
Recommendation
2
(2002),
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/chapter_02.pdf
(noting dangers of tunnel vision); FPT Heads of Prosecution Committee, Report of the
Working Group on the Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice (2005), at
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hop/.
21 See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson, B. Lynn New & James R. Speer, Argument Availability
as a Mediator of Social Theory Perseverance, 3 SOC. COGNITION 235, 244-48 (1985); Kari
Edwards & Edward E. Smith, A Disconfirmation Bias in the Evaluation of Arguments, 71
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1996); Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979); Charles
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prosecutors first search for evidence tending to confirm an initial
suspect’s guilt. Once an opinion of guilt is formed, selective information processing comes into play, causing the prosecutor to weigh
evidence that supports her existing belief more heavily than contradictory evidence. Because of selective information processing, the
prosecutor will accept at face value any additional evidence supporting the initial theory of guilt, while ignoring or undervaluing
potentially exculpatory evidence.22
Contributing further to the stickiness of a prosecutor’s guilt
beliefs is the phenomenon of belief perseverance, in which people
adhere to their beliefs even when the evidence that initially supported the belief is proven to be incorrect.23 In many of the recent
exoneration cases, for example, prosecutors have continued to insist
that the exonerated defendant is guilty, even when exculpatory
DNA evidence undermines the government’s initial case. 24 This

G. Lord, Mark R. Lepper, & Elizabeth Preston, Considering the Opposite: A Corrective
Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231 (1984); Arthur G.
Miller et al., The Attitude Polarization Phenomenon: Role of Response Measure, Attitude
Extremity, and Behavioral Consequences of Reported Attitude Change, 64 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 561, 563-64 (1993); Geoffrey D. Munro & Peter H. Ditto, Biased Assimilation, Attitude Polarization, and Affect in Reactions to Stereotype-Relevant Scientific Information, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 636 (1997).
22 Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor’s Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 559
(1987) (“The natural inclination is not to see inconsistent or contradictory evidence
for what it is, but to categorize it as irrelevant or a petty incongruity.”); James
McCloskey, Convicting the Innocent, 8 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 2, 56 (1989) (noting “a natural tendency to acquire all the evidence that inculpates the person selected as guilty
while all other evidence is ignored”); Medwed, supra note 8, at 140 (noting that “once
the police pinpoint a chief suspect, they neglect to subject exculpatory evidence or
alternative perpetrators to critical examination”); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation With
Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
917, 945 (1999) (noting that prosecutors “get wedded to their theory and things inconsistent with their theory are ignored”).
23Craig A. Anderson, Mark R. Lepper & Lee Ross, Perseverance of Social Theories: The
role of Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1037 (1980); Lee Ross, Mark R. Lepper & Michael Hubbard, Perseverance in
Self-Perception and Social Perception: Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 880, 882 (1975).
24 For example, after Earl Washington was exonerated after serving seventeen years
for murder and rape, the prosecutor insisted that he still could not “rule out” Washington as a suspect. Maria Glod, DNA Not Enough to Charge Va. Rapist; Authorities
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seemingly inhumane stubbornness can be viewed instead as a very
human example of belief perseverance.25
Sticky beliefs in guilt might be particularly difficult to shake
given that prosecutors live in a world that constantly reinforces
their perceptions that the defendants charged in their cases are all
guilty. A prosecutor who is surrounded in her daily routine only by
crime victims, police officers, and other prosecutors might develop
a deepened “presumption of guilt” that can contribute to cognitive
bias.26 Moreover, the vast majority of cases end in conviction, either
by trial or more often by guilty plea. Accordingly, prosecutors are
likely to see the end results as validation of their initial theories of
guilt.27 At the same time, they are infrequently challenged by evidence to the contrary.28
Ironically, entertaining the possibility of innocence might
be particularly difficult for ethical prosecutors, especially postconviction. Most prosecutors believe they have an ethical obligation
to pursue charges only against those suspects who are actually
guilty.29 Accordingly, for an ethical prosecutor, the avoidance of

Kept Identity a Secret, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2004, at B4. See Eric M. Freedman,
Earl Washington’s Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1089, 1101 (2001) (detailing the history
of the Washington case). See generally Sara Rimer, DNA Testing in Rape Cases Frees
Prisoner After 15 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at A12 (prosecutor stating in the face
of exonerating DNA evidence that there is “no reason to doubt the validity of [the
defendant’s] confession”); Bruce Lambert, Prosecutor Will Retry Man Freed by DNA in
L.I. Rape-Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003, at B5 (announcing prosecutor’s decision
to retry released defendant on the basis of his retracted confession).
25 Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 315 (“The belief perseverance phenomenon is
apparent in many of the wrongful conviction cases.”).
26 See Bandes, supra note 15, at 487 (noting that prosecutorial relationships affect
prosecutorial loyalties); Fisher, supra note 8, at 208 (noting that prosecutors are typically isolated from populations who might trigger empathy for defendants, while
surrounded by populations “who can graphically establish that the defendant deserves punishment and who have no reason to be concerned with competing values
of justice”).
27 See Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 330.
28 Id. (noting that prosecutors receive little feedback inconsistent with their initial
assessments of guilt).
29 See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 219 (1990)
(“[C]onscientious prosecutors do not put the destructive engine of the criminal proc-
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cognitive dissonance can be a powerful motivation to adhere to
guilt beliefs, lest she admit to herself the difficult truth that she may
have charged—and perhaps even convicted—an innocent person.30
II. Prosecutor-Implemented Debiasing Strategies
Many reforms aimed at the prevention of wrongful convictions are based on a fault-based model of explaining prosecutorial
decisions. Through a fault-based lens, commentators have called for
“carrot and stick”31 reforms intended to incentivize prosecutors to
do justice and deter them from wrongdoing, such as more stringent
ethical rules directed at prosecutors,32 restrictions on prosecutorial
discretion, 33 and increased sanctions by courts and bars against
prosecutors who violate ethical rules or abuse their discretion.34
More recent reform proposals have gone beyond a faultbased paradigm and focus instead on the mitigation of cognitive
bias among prosecutors. Some of these suggestions, however, cannot be implemented by prosecutors alone. For example, to decrease
the likelihood of wrongful convictions due to prosecutorial cognitive bias, scholars have suggested changes in the ways prosecutors
are elected; 35 increased disclosure of information from police to

ess into motion unless they are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
is guilty.”).
30 Bandes, supra note 15, at 491.
31 Medwed, supra note 8, at 171-75 (discussing use of “sticks,” not just carrots, to
incentivize good prosecutorial conduct).
32 Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1587-88
(2003).
33 See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat
of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 460-64 (2001); Robert Heller, Comment, Selective
Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1325-26 (1997).
34 Gershman, supra note 8, at 455 (1992) (suggesting creation of specialized body for
considering disciplinary claims against prosecutors); Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor
Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence,
71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 889 (1998) (noting an “absence of disciplinary sanctions against
prosecutors, even in the most egregious cases”); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional
Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001).
35 Medwed, supra note 8, at 178-80.
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prosecutors;36 changes to the constitutional standard governing the
disclosure of evidence to the defense;37 reliance on an inquisitorial
model of fact-finding;38 and prophylactic measures to enhance the
accuracy of the forms of evidence that can often lead to wrongful
convictions, such as confessions39 and eyewitness testimony.40 All of

Burke, supra note 14, at 1616; Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 387-88.
Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 390 (advocating the expansion of criminal discovery as a means to counter tunnel vision); Bennett L. Gershman, State Constitutionalization of Criminal Procedure and the Prosecutor's Disclosure Obligations, 18 WESTCHESTER
B.J. 101, 104 n.17 (1991) (suggesting liberalization of criminal discovery rules); Mary
Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities,
2006 WIS. L. REV. 541; 594-613 (suggesting reforms to broaden criminal discovery);
Rosen, supra note 6, at 272-74 (advocating open discovery in criminal cases to mitigate harms caused by police and prosecutorial tunnel vision). See also Innocence
Comm’n for Va., A Vision for Justice: Report and Recommendations Regarding Wrongful
Convictions in the Commonwealth of Virginia 67-68 (2005), available at
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/press/reports/pdfs/17241.pdf (recommending
open file discovery to reduce the likelihood of wrongful convictions).
While many would argue that the decision regarding what evidence to disclose to
the defense rests entirely within a prosecutor’s discretion, despite the limits of a
prosecutor’s minimally required constitutional obligations under Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), I list the disclosure of evidence as a reform that is not wholly
within a prosecutor’s prerogative. The prosecutor’s duty to do justice involves dual,
and sometimes paradoxical, aims “that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.”
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). See also Bandes, supra note 15, at 483
(noting the tension between a prosecutor’s dual roles). It is a prosecutor’s duty not
only “to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction,” but also “to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.” Berger, 295
U.S. at 88. Accordingly, some prosecutors would argue that to disclose evidence to
the defense beyond what is required by Brady is a failure to use all legitimate means
to secure a conviction and therefore undermines a prosecutor’s law enforcement
obligations. From this perspective, it is the courts’ obligation, not an individual
prosecutor’s, to determine the “legitimate means” that are permissible.
38 Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 396 (suggestion the creation of external commissions authorized to review post-conviction claims of innocence using inquisitorial
powers); Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1241, 1302-03 (2001) (suggesting creation of commission
to review post-conviction claims of innocence similar to England’s bipartisan Criminal Cases Review Commission); Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 142-51 (1996) (suggesting that the inquisitorial trial system
may have truth-seeking advantages over the adversarial system).
39 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (2006) (noting that “videotaping police interrogations … could
improve monitoring and credibility”); Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 377-80 (suggesting reforms to police interrogation techniques based on Great Britain’s Police
36
37
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these reform proposals involve doctrinal or institutional changes
whose implementation would appear either unlikely or at least to
require some involvement by courts or other non-prosecutorial actors. This Essay, in contrast, focuses on relatively modest debiasing
strategies that could be implemented immediately and entirely by
prosecutors, either individually or at a supervisory or institutional
level.
A. Education
Some empirical evidence suggests that education can potentially mitigate bias, especially if the education focuses on the
cognitive processes that can lead to bias.41 It is not surprising, therefore, that commentators have continually called for increased
prosecutorial training regarding the dangers of cognitive bias. 42
This is an especially easy reform for prosecutors to institute. Most
prosecutors’ offices already conduct internal educational sessions

and Criminal Evidence Act); Thomas Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127 (2005); Innocence
Comm’n for Va., supra note 37, at 54-59 (recommendations for improving interrogation procedures to reduce risks of wrongful convictions).
40 See, e.g., Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 346-48 (arguing that the doctrinal standard governing the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence is “particularly susceptible to the kinds of cognitive biases that underlie tunnel vision”). See also
Innocence Comm’n for Va., supra note 37, at 36-42 (recommendations for eyewitness
identification procedures).
41 RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS
OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 191 (1980) (“The effectiveness of a variety of procedures for
discrediting information may also depend on their capacity to make subjects aware
of some of the processes underlying the perseverance of their beliefs.”).
42 Bandes, supra note 15, at 494 (“training of both supervisory and lower level personnel must explicitly address the dynamics of tunnel vision”); Burke, supra note 14,
at 1616; Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 374 (“prosecutors and judges should be
educated about the causes of, and correctives for, tunnel vision”); Fisher, supra note
8, at 258; Medwed, supra note 8, at 170-71 (advocating continuing education about
ethical obligations of prosecutors); Thomas P. Sullivan, Keynote Address: Reforming
Eyewitness Identification, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 265, 268 (2004) (“We
should also support initiatives to train detectives, prosecutors, and judges about
confirmatory bias or tunnel vision, which creates the risk of wrongful charges and
convictions.”).
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for their lawyers to comply with state bar requirements of continuing legal education. Prosecutors’ offices could readily supplement
existing programs with additional training about the various forms
of cognitive bias and the dangers they present for prosecutorial decision making.
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence also suggests that
cognitive bias is stubborn, and that education is an unlikely panacea.43 Accordingly, prosecutors should couple education about cognitive biases with training about debiasing strategies that could be
either incorporated into daily practice by individual prosecutors, or
institutionalized as a matter of office policy.
B. Debiasing Through “Cavern Vision”
Social scientists have found that both induced counterargument and exposure to opposing views can reverse the effects of
cognitive bias.44 Relying in part upon this empirical evidence, the
emerging literature about prosecutorial cognitive bias emphasizes
the importance of checks on a prosecutor’s decision making. If tunnel vision contributes to wrongful convictions, then exposure to a
diversity of views that challenge presumptions of guilt should prevent them. Prosecutors could develop this type of neutralizing

43 Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 5; Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 371;
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 32 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
44 Craig A. Anderson & Elizabeth S. Sechler, Effects of Explanation and Counterexplanation on the Development and Use of Social Theories, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
24, 27-29 (1986) (finding that subjects’ generation of counterarguments reversed the
effects of bias-induced beliefs); Lord, Lepper & Preston, supra note 21, at 1231 (finding that both induced counterargument and exposure to materials making opposing
possibilities more salient helped mitigate both confirmation bias and selective information processing). See generally Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect
Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence,
91 GEO. L.J. 67, 133 n. 207 (summarizing the empirical literature and concluding that
“asking or directing experimental subjects to consider alternative or opposing arguments, positions, or evidence has been found to ameliorate the adverse effects of
several biases”).
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“cavern vision” in three ways: individually, through self-checking
role-playing as one’s own Devil’s Advocate; collectively, through
the use of internal review processes; and institutionally, by submitting prosecutorial decision making to external review.
1. Devil’s Advocacy
Empirical evidence suggests that cognitive bias can be mitigated when people are forced to articulate arguments that contradict their existing beliefs. 45 Accordingly, individual prosecutors
could attempt to neutralize their decision making by regularly
“switching sides” on their files and reviewing cases from the perspective of defense counsel.46 Applied to lawyers, the practice of
counterargument not only serves as a debiasing strategy, but also
amounts to the good lawyering skill of acting as one’s own Devil’s
Advocate. To neutralize confirmation bias, a prosecutor reviewing a
file should not only look for evidence supporting the defendant’s
guilt, but also scrutinize the case with the eye of a defense attorney
searching for reasonable doubt. To mitigate selective information
processing, the prosecutor should not simply accept evidence that

Joel Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions:
Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 691 (2000) (concluding that belief perseverance can be reduced if people articulate arguments in
support of contrary beliefs); Lord, Lepper & Preston, supra note 21, at 1239 (“In two
different domains of social judgment, biased assimilation of new evidence and biased hypothesis testing…the cognitive strategy of considering opposite possibilities
promoted impartiality.”) (internal citations omitted); Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 188
(1998) (suggesting that the articulation of counterarguments can mitigate individuals’ overconfidence in their own judgments).
46 Burke, supra note 14, at 1618 (advocating practice of switching sides); see also
Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 371-72 (advocating institutionalization of mechanisms to encourage counterargument throughout investigation and prosecution);
Michael J. Saks & D. Michael Risinger, Baserates, The Presumption of Guilt, Admissibility Rulings, and Erroneous Convictions, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1051, 1056-57 (noting
that others have previously argued that investigators could neutralize their “presumption of guilt” by testing theories of guilt using the scientific method of searching for contradictory evidence).
45
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appears inculpatory; instead, she should force herself to articulate
any basis for skepticism. Similarly, she should not just assume that
seemingly exculpatory evidence is fabricated or unreliable; she
should force herself to anticipate its value to the defense.
Counterargument could be particularly effective in exoneration cases to mitigate prosecutorial belief perseverance. In many
exoneration cases, prosecutors have adhered to their original guilt
assessments by clinging to any remaining evidence that is consistent with the defendant’s guilt, even after the exonerating evidence
has called part of the government’s original case into question. For
example, regardless of newly available, exculpatory DNA evidence
that undermines the physical evidence offered against the defendant at trial, a prosecutor might still point to the defendant’s confession to argue that the defendant is guilty.47 The rational question,
of course, is not whether some evidence exists that is merely consistent with the defendant’s guilt, but rather whether the remaining
available evidence—in its totality, including exculpatory evidence—
is sufficient to support charges. Using the practice of counterargument, a prosecutor might avoid belief perseverance by working
through possible alternative explanations for any remaining evidence of guilt, such as the possibility that the defendant gave a false
confession.
2. Internal Reviews
Although individual prosecutors can attempt to provide
their own checks on cognitive bias, an additional method of injecting neutrality into prosecutorial decision making is to involve additional, potentially less biased prosecutors in the decision making
process. 48 A “fresh look” by attorneys unassociated with initial
sticky charging decisions may dilute the biasing effects of selective

See examples, supra note 24.
Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 388 (advocating use of multiple levels of case
review as “another check against tunnel vision”); Bandes, supra note 15, at 493-94
47
48
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information processing and belief perseverance. 49 Fresh looks
would appear to be particularly helpful in cases where some of the
government’s original evidence against a defendant has been undermined; a new lawyer could review the case considering only the
remaining evidence, untainted by the lingering effects of belief perseverance. A fresh-look attorney would also be in a better position
to bring neutrality to a defendant’s claim of innocence, because she
would have less of a stake in avoiding the cognitive dissonance of
having charged or convicted an innocent person.
Internal fresh-look reviews could occur either formally or
informally. Offices with sufficient resources could create a formal
layer of internal review, at least in some limited categories of highstakes cases, such as death penalty cases, other major crimes, or
post-conviction claims of innocence.50 For lesser-stake cases, or in
offices that lack the resources to institutionalize internal review,
even the encouragement of informal counterargument might be
productive. Informal debate in which colleagues serve as mock adversaries would serve both to hone attorneys’ advocacy skills and to
mitigate the effects of cognitive bias.51

(advocating “review mechanisms . . . at every level of decision-making” that should
perform a critical “naysaying function”).
49 See Burke, supra note 14, at 1621 (suggesting “fresh look” reviews by additional
prosecutors); Brown, supra note 15, at 1620-21 (recommending that higher-level
prosecutors act as a supervisory, internal check on prosecutorial decision making).
50 Medwed, supra note 8, at 175-77 (suggesting the creation of specialized postconviction units to review innocence claims); Peter Neufeld, Legal and Ethical Implications of Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 639, 641 (2001) ("increasingly, progressive-minded prosecutors around the country are setting up their
own "innocence projects'" and citing several examples); Brendan Riley, Innocence
Project Urges DNA Test Changes in Nevada Crime Cases, Associated Press, Mar. 18, 2002
(“Some Nevada prosecutors have their own "innocence projects' to re-examine old
capital cases for errors.”).
51 Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 389 (noting that even “informal discussions and
debates among peer prosecutors regarding serious, complex and borderline cases
can help reduce the risk that tunnel vision will negatively affect prosecutorial decision-making”).
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3. External Transparency
Although prosecutors can try to serve as one another’s
Devil’s Advocates, they may ultimately feel pressure to conform
their opinions to their colleagues.52 Accordingly, a final method of
checking prosecutorial cognitive bias is to introduce external checks
on prosecutor decision making. This could be accomplished indirectly by increasing the transparency of prosecutorial decisions that
usually take place behind closed doors.53 For example, Professors
Angela Davis and Daniel Medwed have each recommended the
creation of prosecutorial public information offices to disclose
prosecutorial policies and increase prosecutorial accountability.54
More controversially, prosecutors could also submit to direct external checks on their decision making by permitting outsiders such as judges, civil practitioners, and defense attorneys to review their discretionary conduct. Although prosecutors might balk
at any outside review that threatens the broad discretion they legitimately enjoy, 55 I have previously suggested that fresh look
committees could serve in an entirely advisory capacity and only
over extremely limited factual questions, thereby preserving the full
scope of prosecutorial discretion. 56 Such a committee might be

See generally SOLOMON E. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952) (reporting that subjects
adopted incorrect positions to conform to others); Leonard Berkowitz & Nigel
Walker, Laws and Moral Judgments, 30 SOCIOMETRY 410, 415-22 (1967) (finding that
subjects’ approval of conduct conformed to peers).
53 See generally Bandes, supra note 15, at 494 (noting that review of prosecutorial decisions “will be ineffective without transparency”); Bibas, supra note 39 (arguing for
increased transparency throughout the criminal justice system); Findley & Scott,
supra note 15, at 391 (advocating increased transparency as a means of neutralizing
cognitive bias).
54 Davis, supra note 33, at 461-62 (suggesting that public disclosure of prosecutorial
policies “would promote prosecutorial accountability and public confidence in the
criminal justice system”); Medwed, supra note 8, at 177-78 (advocating transparency
in prosecutorial policies, including the creation of public information offices, as a
method of improving political accountability).
55 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (discussing the judiciary’s
reluctance to impede on prosecutorial discretion).
56 For example, a fresh look committee might offer an opinion regarding the strength
of the evidence in an individual case or the potential exculpatory value of evidence
52
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modeled after the civilian review boards that increasingly monitor
police in limited capacities, but do not dictate a department’s general policing strategies.57
Conclusion
A cognitive explanation for prosecutorial decision making
is desirable for two separate reasons. Most obviously, it helps to
shape the direction of reform by demonstrating the importance of
debiasing strategies, rather than simply instituting reforms directed
at intentional misconduct.58 Moreover, by avoiding the language of
fault, a discursive shift toward a cognitive explanation for prosecutorial decision making holds more promise for including prosecutors in the growing dialogue about the prevention of wrongful convictions.59
Emerging recently from that dialogue has been a narrative
trend that increasingly depicts prosecutors as victims of cognitive
accidents as opposed to purposeful or reckless wrongdoers. Professor Medwed, for example, has criticized the institutional culture of
prosecutors’ offices for prioritizing conviction rates, but emphasizes
that “many prosecutors certainly resist the conviction psychology
and that individual prosecutors may possess a range of motives,

that is in question. Limited consulting roles such as these would not interfere with
the broader policy questions that generally justify deference to prosecutorial discretion, such as a jurisdiction’s enforcement priorities or its allocation of resources.
Burke, supra note 14, at 1623. Cf. Davis, supra note 33, at 463-64 (2001) (advocating the
creation of Prosecution Review Boards to review complaints against and review the
discretionary decisions of prosecutors).
57 See generally David H. Bayley, Community Policing: A Report from the Devil’s Advocate, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 225, 236-37 (Jack R. Greene &
Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality
of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
551, 665 (1997).
58 Burke, supra note 14, at 1632; see also Bandes, supra note 15, at 485 (noting that “the
cognitive biases which undergird many of the problems with the decision-making
process are poorly captured by concepts of fault and intentional misconduct”).
59 Burke, supra note 14, at 1633.
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including a profound commitment to doing justice.” 60 Similarly,
Professors Keith Findley and Michael Scott describe the problem as
“pressures on prosecutors that can cause them to act in ways that
subvert justice, whether intentionally or, as is more often the case,
unintentionally.” 61 Professor Susan Bandes has noted that while
some of the prosecutorial behavior leading to wrongful convictions
“involves lying, deliberately withholding evidence, and other bad
faith behavior, . . . [m]uch of it . . . involves prosecutors simply trying to do their job as they see it.”62 She dismisses explanations of
“fault and blame” as “counterproductive,” and suggests an alternative focus on “the systemic institutional causes of tunnel vision,”
even for the “conscientious prosecutor.”63
This Essay has sought both to shape the direction of reform
and to involve conscientious prosecutors in the ongoing innocence
dialogue by focusing on debiasing strategies that can be implemented entirely within the province of prosecutors, either as individual practice or as institutional policy. In doing so, I hope to encourage prosecutors to accept the olive branch extended to them by
the innocence movement’s current narrative trend. Moreover, I
hope to persuade prosecutors that they have only a limited opportunity to do so.
Despite heightened awareness about the role that tunnel vision has played in recent wrongful convictions, it is still uncommon
for prosecutors to receive any education about cognitive bias or the
ways in which it can affect prosecutorial decision making.64 And
despite repeated calls for reforms in the ways by which prosecutors
are evaluated for promotion, most prosecutors’ offices continue to
emphasize conviction rates in measuring an attorney’s worth. 65

Medwed, supra note 8, at 181.
Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 295.
62 Bandes, supra note 15, at 479.
63 Id. at 485.
64 See Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 333 (noting that law enforcement is rarely
trained in the dangers of tunnel vision).
65 See Berenson, supra note 10, at 846 (asserting that “career advancement in prosecutors’ offices should be based on richer measures of compliance with the ‘do justice’
60
61
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Prosecutors cannot simply ignore the problems that can contribute
to wrongful convictions and expect others to continue to depict
them as noble attorneys who sometimes make mistakes. As Findley
and Scott recently observed, “tunnel vision in the criminal justice
system exists not despite our best efforts to overcome these cognitive biases and institutional pressures, but because of our deliberate
systemic choices.”66 And many of those systemic choices, as I have
noted in this Essay, can be altered only by prosecutors, particularly
those with the authority to shape their institutions.
In contrast, outsiders hold the keys to many of the reforms
that are shaped by fault-based initiatives.67 For example, state bar
organizations could enact more stringent rules to limit the discretion of prosecutors. They could bring more charges and impose
greater sanctions against prosecutors who are involved in overcharging, nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence, or wrongful convictions. Courts could be less deferential to the broad discretion that
prosecutors currently enjoy. Prosecutors would presumably oppose
all of these outsider-initiated, fault-based reforms. However, reformists will be left with few other alternatives if prosecutors do not
accept the opportunity to disprove the traditional fault-based narrative by taking steps to improve their own decision making.

standard, rather than simply on conviction rates”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of
Prosecutors in Dealing with Police Abuse: The Lessons of Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L. 305, 320-21 (2001) (demonstrating that promotions for prosecutors were tied to
conviction rates, which rewards prosecutors for ignoring police misconduct, and
proposing alternative incentives); Meares, supra note 7, at 853 (proposing financial
incentives for prosecutors to charge defendants accurately); Medwed, supra note 8, at
172 (arguing that performance standards for prosecutors should consider both conviction rates and an attorney’s decisions not to prosecute).
66 Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 333.
67 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of fault-based reforms.

